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Redacted Disclosure
Abstract
In this paper we investigate a firm’s decision to redact proprietary information from its
material contract filings. Information redaction results when the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) grants a firm’s request to withhold information from investors in its
material contract filings, presumably because the information is proprietary. We
hypothesize that when firms redact information, measures of adverse selection
deteriorate. That is, the redaction of proprietary information from material contracts
should be associated with: a larger adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread;
reductions in market depth; and lower market turnover. In addition, we conjecture that
the decision to redact depends on whether the firm plans on raising capital, the
competitiveness of the firm’s industry, and the performance of the firm. Overall the
results of our analysis generally support our predictions. We find that when firms redact
information, contemporaneous measures of the adverse selection component of the bidask spread rise, and market depth and share turnover deteriorate; this suggests an increase
in adverse selection. We also find firms are less likely to redact when they issue long
term debt, and are more likely to redact when they are in a competitive industry or
experience losses.

1. Introduction
An economic consequence commonly associated with a firm’s disclosure choice
is the severity of the adverse selection problem inherent in the buying and selling of firm
shares. For example, decreased disclosure should exacerbate adverse selection, thereby
increasing the extent to which parties to a transaction involved in the purchase or sale of
firm shares need to price-protect themselves.

Adverse selection severity should be

manifest in a variety of market proxies, such as bid-ask spreads, market depth, and share
turnover. In addition, it should be associated with that part of the firm’s cost of capital
that arises from information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders, and/or
among investors.1
Despite these claims, recent work posits that when firms report under US
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP), the richness of the information
environment may preclude finding a relation between a firm’s disclosure choice and the
economic consequences related to that choice.2 This is likely the cause of the mixed
results from research that explores the association between the cost of capital and
disclosure.3
For example, Botosan (1997) finds that there is a significant relation between her
measure of the extent of disclosure and the cost of capital, but this relation only exists for
firms that have low analyst following.

Botosan and Frost (1998), using a similar

disclosure metric, find that foreign firms that trade in U.S. equity markets and make more
timely disclosures have higher liquidity.

They do not find results on the level of

1

See, for example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Verrecchia (2001).
See, for example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Verrecchia (2001).
3
Leuz and Verrechia (2000) provide evidence that measures of accounting quality are associated with
measures of the cost of capital in Germany’s Neuer market.
2
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disclosure and the cost of capital. Sengupta (1998) investigates whether disclosure is
associated with the cost of debt, and finds that firms that have higher analyst disclosure
ratings have lower costs of debt. Welker (1995) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999)
find a similar association between the cost of equity capital and analyst ratings. Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000), however, highlight the difficulty in drawing inferences from
associations between analyst ratings and cost of capital, in that analyst ratings only
measure an analyst’s perception of the quality of the firm’s disclosure.
In an attempt to find a disclosure choice under US-GAAP that may lead to a
relation between that choice and a firm’s cost of capital through adverse selection, we
consider firms that withhold proprietary information from investors by redacting the
information from their material contract filings.4 Regulation S-K requires all material
contracts or agreements into which a firm enters to be filed with its 8K, 10K, 10Q, or
registration statements.5 If a contract is definitively material in that all of the firm’s
auditors, the SEC, and plaintiffs bar conclude that an average investor ought to be
informed, then the firm must disclose the contract.

The SEC does provide firms,

however, with an element of discretion by allowing firms to request that proprietary
information contained within the contract be withheld.6 If the SEC grants the firm’s
request for confidentiality, investors and other financial statement users will have no
access to the redacted data (although the SEC will). By redacting data, firms are able to
4

Carter and Soo (1999) examine the information content of 8k disclosures and find that the market does
react to the information in the 8k (either shortly before the 8k is filed, or on the filing date). One piece of
information that can be contained in an 8k is a material contract. Thus this study implies that the market
considers material contracts to be value relevant.
5
For a more precise description of the SEC’s regulations regarding the filing of material contracts see
Regulation SK subpart 229.600 - Exhibits. An electronic version of regulation SK can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/regsk.htm
6
Rule 406 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 24b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
provide a detailed description of when,how, and the process a firm must go through to request to have
information redacted from a filing.
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avoid disclosing information that they deem proprietary, thereby reducing the overall
amount of information that is disclosed to the public. Over the past decade requests for
confidential treatment have burgeoned, even though the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) makes it difficult for firms to withhold redacted information indefinitely.
For example, in a recent legal bulletin by the SEC’s Division of Corporate
Finance, the SEC indicates that “in recent years, the number of confidential treatment
requests (‘CTRs’ or ‘applications’) processed by the Division has increased steadily from
approximately 540 in fiscal year 1992 to more than 1,000 in fiscal year 1996.”7 A text
search of Lexis-Nexis for the year 2000 using the phrase “confidential treatment”
indicates that as many as 4000 documents filed in association with the firm’s 10K
mention confidential treatment. So as to avoid having to disclose these contracts under
the FOIA, the SEC states: “most applicants rely on the [FOIA] exemption that covers
trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.”8
In light of firms applying for and receiving confidential treatment in the presence
of materiality, there may exist substantial heterogeneity in the quality and quantity of
information disclosed in the material contract portion of the firm’s financial statements.
We provide evidence on the consequences of the decision to reduce disclosure by
investigating how the redaction of material contract information from financial reports
affects firms’ proxies for adverse selection. We also investigate possible determinants of
the decision to redact financial information from a firm’s financial reports.

7

See the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 (with Addendum)
"Confidential Treatment Requests" Action: Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin, February 28, 1997.
8
Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 (1997).
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Redaction allows firms with “bad news” to pool with firms with “better news,”
but not sufficiently better to warrant bearing the proprietary costs associated with full
disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). This creates adverse selection in the market for
firms’ shares. For example, we predict that firms that choose to redact information
encounter higher adverse selection through: a larger adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread; smaller quoted dollar-depths; and lower share turnover. We also
hypothesize that firms are less likely to redact information in years in which they issue
stock or public debt. Finally, we hypothesize that the degree of competition in a firm’s
product markets and the profitability of the firm affect the decision to redact information.
We use the material contract disclosures in the 10K to identify firms that redact
material contract information from their financial reports. We focus our analysis on
small, publicly traded, non-financial companies that filed at least one material contract
during fiscal 2001. We focus on small firms for two reasons. First, small firms are less
likely to be followed by analysts, and are less likely to have competing sources of
information available. Thus, the redaction of proprietary information is likely to be a
more significant event. Second, we hand-collect redaction data. This precludes us from
using a large sample of firms and examining the effects of firm size.
We find that slightly more than 15% of the firms in our sample elected to redact
information from their material contract disclosures during the fiscal year 2001, and over
25% of our firms disclosed that they had redacted information from at least one material
contract in the past. These statistics suggest that there is a significant amount of variation
in the extent of the disclosure of material contract information.

4

We find that the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread is
larger when the firm redacts material contract information. We also find that the quoted
dollar depth and share turnover decrease when firms redact information from their
material contract filings.

In addition, we provide preliminary evidence on the

determinants of the decision to redact information. We find that firms are less likely to
redact financial information when they issue long term debt. We also find that firms are
more likely to redact when they have suffered financial losses. Both of these results are
consistent with the extant literature that finds that disclosure is associated with the
propensity to raise capital and firm profitability.
We also find that firms are less likely to redact information when they face less
competition. In their review article on the empirical disclosure literature, Healy and
Palepu (2001) posit that there is little evidence on the relationship between competition
and disclosure. Thus, our results on industry competition are potentially interesting as
they provide some insight into how competition affects disclosure choices.
We conclude our analysis by investigating whether our results are attributable to a
self-selection bias. Using the Heckman self-selection correction methodology (Heckman,
1976), we find that for two of our three adverse selection measures (the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread and dollar depth), the potential bias does not affect our
results. The results on share turnover are insignificant after controlling for self-selection.
This suggests that the type of firm that redacts information affects share turnover.
Finally, in untabulated sensitivity analyses we investigate whether these results are
sensitive to alternative adverse selection measures and alternative measures of the extent

5

of redaction; we find that our results are not sensitive to these alternative research design
choices.
Overall, the results of this paper indicate that there is a relation between a firm’s
decision to redact material contract disclosures and measures of adverse selection even
though US GAAP effectuates a rich disclosure environment. In addition, we find that
small firms are more likely to redact when they are in more competitive industries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.

In Section 2 we state our

hypotheses, and in Section 3 introduce the instruments used to test them. In Section 4 we
discuss the sample selection procedures, and in Section 5 provide a detailed explanation
of the research design. Section 6 discusses results, and Section 7 offers concluding
comments.
2. Hypothesis Development
Our hypotheses about the effects of redacting proprietary information from a
firm’s material contract filings are based on conventional notions of how disclosure
affects trade in firm shares. Redaction provides a refuge, or “safe harbor,” for firms with
“bad news” to pool with firms with “better news” by appealing to the rationale that the
news is proprietary. This exacerbates adverse selection, thereby increasing the extent to
which parties to a transaction involved in the purchase or sale of firm shares need to
price-protect themselves.
The literature offers a variety of ways to measure adverse selection.

The

measures we examine are bid-ask spreads, market depth, and share turnover. Jaffe and
Winkler (1976) and Stoll (1978) argue that the firm’s bid-ask spread is related to the
extent of information asymmetry about the firm. They assert that market makers face

6

potential losses when trading against informed investors. To protect themselves from
these losses, market makers increase bid-ask spreads as the probability that they are
trading against informed investors increases. Glosten and Harris (1988) introduce a
methodology to identify the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We use
this methodology to develop our bid-ask spread measure.
Easly, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)
suggest that share volume is related to costs that arise from adverse selection. Illiquid
stocks have large variation in order flow; active days are interspersed with slow days. If
private information motivates trades on active days, market makers could be subject to
large losses.

This suggests that firms with low trade volumes are more likely to

experience costs related to adverse selection. We use this methodology to develop our
share turnover measure.
Lee, Muckalow, and Ready (1994) and Callahan, Lee, and Yohn (1996) assert
that in addition to bid-ask spreads, market makers adjust market depth to reduce the costs
associated with traders that have an informational advantage. That is, when market
makers are more likely to be trading against investors with superior information, market
makers have an incentive to reduce the number of shares they are willing to trade at the
quoted prices. By reducing depth, market makers can reduce their exposure to trading
against informed traders. Consistent with this conjecture, Heflin and Shaw (2001) find a
significant negative correlation (75%) between the adverse selection component of the
firm’s bid-ask spread and quoted depth. We follow Rogers (2005), and use quoted dollar
depths as our depth measure.

7

Our first hypothesis is that these three measures (i.e., the adverse selection
component of their bid-ask spreads, share turnover, and quoted market depths) deteriorate
when firms redact information from their disclosures.
We also examine the determinants of the decision to redact. Here, we rely
primarily on the hypotheses developed in the extant literature for the factors that are
expected to affect the decision to disclosure. For example, we hypothesize that the
decision to redact material contract information depends on whether the firm plans to
issue stock or debt.

Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1997), Frankel et al. (1995), and

Sengupta (1998) find that firms increase disclosure or provide higher quality disclosures
in anticipation of upcoming public debt or equity offerings. These studies imply that
firms are less likely to redact information if they plan a public debt or equity offering in
the future.
Next, we hypothesize that the decision to redact information depends on
competitiveness in a firm’s product market. The theoretical literature offers conflicting
arguments as to how competition affects the firm’s decision to disclose proprietary
information.

Darrough and Stoughton (1990) argue that greater competition fosters

greater disclosure as a device to thwart entry into a product market. Alternatively,
Verrecchia (1990) argues that greater competition inhibits disclosure in markets
comprised of mature competitors (i.e., post-entry). Healy and Palepu (2001) posit that
the empirical literature offers little direct evidence on how competition affects the
decision to disclose proprietary information (pg 424). This may be in part attributable to
the difficulty in measuring proprietary costs. The conflicting theoretical predictions, in
combination with the absence of empirical evidence on how competition affects
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disclosure, suggests that it is not clear how competition affects a firm’s decision to redact
material contract information.
Our final hypothesis is that firm performance affects the decision to redact
information. Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that it is not clear how firm performance
affects the decision to disclose. Profitable firms may choose not to disclose because
disclosure encourages entrance and competition. Alternatively, if there are costs to
disclosure, then more profitable firms have stronger incentives to disclose and reduce
costs that result from adverse selection. Thus, it is not clear whether performance is
positively or negatively associated with the extent of disclosure. In the next section we
develop instruments to test our hypotheses.
3. Proxy Development
In the previous section we hypothesize that redaction affects adverse selection.
To determine whether firms redact information from their material contract filings, we
must first determine whether a firm has entered into a material contract, and then
determine whether the firm has redacted information from the contract. Firms enter into
material contracts throughout the year. The SEC requires that when a firm enters into a
material contract, they file an 8K. Practically, instead of filing an 8K, many firms elect to
disclose the existence of the contract in their next SEC filing. Thus material contracts are
often filed with the firms 10K, 10Q, registration statements, 8K, proxy statements, etc.
Fortunately, to determine whether a firm filed a material contract we do not have
to search each SEC filing. Instead, the SEC requires each firm to maintain an exhibit list
of all material contracts that the firm has entered into in the past year.9

9

This exhibit list

The exhibit list also includes a reference to all unexpired material contracts that the firm has entered into
in the past.

9

can usually be found under item 14 in the firm’s 10K.

10

We use the exhibit list to

identify all material contract filings made by the firm starting the first day of fiscal 2001
and ending three months after the last day of fiscal 2001. Material contracts are always
filed as exhibit 10.XXX, where the XXX is the exhibit number. The exhibit list typically
reports the nature of the contract, whether the firm has requested confidential treatment,
and the filing in which the material contract was disclosed. We use this exhibit list to
determine whether firms redact information from their filings.
For each firm’s 2001 fiscal year we go through the exhibit index and identify all
material contracts the firm filed starting with the first day of fiscal 2001, and ending three
months after the last day of fiscal 2001. We then identify all material contracts in which
the firm was granted a request for confidential treatment. Typically, one can quickly
identify a contract that was redacted by searching for the phrase “Confidential treatment.”
We then create an indicator variable, Redactdum, that is one for each firm that filed a
request confidential treatment for material contract information during the 15 month
period beginning the first day of fiscal 2001 and ending three months after the last day of
fiscal 2001, and is zero otherwise.11
As we discuss above, we employ three measures of adverse selection. The first
measure is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. To calculate the bid10

See Section 66000 of regulation S-K entitled Exhibits (Item 601) for the SEC’s rules regarding the filing
of material contracts.
11
To identify the date that the market learns that the firm requested confidential treatment for a material
contract, we started with the exhibit list to identify requests for confidential treatment and the relevant SEC
filing in which the material contract was filed. We then used Lexis/Nexis to obtain the date of the filing
that first mentions the material contract with redacted data. Firms often file material contracts multiple
times, thus there may be several filings mentioning the redacted contract. Thus, to ensure that we properly
identified the first mention of the redacted contract, for each firm with a redacted contract, we searched the
firm’s 10K, 10Q, 8K, and registration statements using the phrase “confidential treatment” for fiscal years
2000, 2001 and 2002. This procedure allowed us to identify several instances where the exhibit list did not
correctly identify the first filing of the redacted contract.
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ask spread for each firm, we follow the methodology suggested in Glosten and Harris
(1988). We start by collecting all of the quote data on the TAQ database for the 15month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the
end of the fiscal year. We focus on this sample period to ensure that our spread variable
reflects any material contract disclosed in a fiscal year 2001 SEC report. We eliminate
any trades that did not occur on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchanges. We also
eliminate any quotes that were not made under normal market conditions (i.e., all quotes
that do not have a mode=12 on the TAQ database). We also eliminate all aggregate
quotes, and all quotes that occur outside normal trading hours. We follow a similar
procedure for the trade data, and then use the procedure suggested by Lee and Ready
(1991) to match the quote data and the trade data. We then run the following regression
for each firm using fifteen months of trade and quote data:
∆Pricet = C0∆Quotet + C1∆QuotetTrdsizet +Z0Quotet + Z1QuotetTrdsizet + ε.
where:
Price is the observed transaction price,
TrdSize is number of shares traded in the transaction at time t, and
Quote is an indicator that is equal to +1 if the quote is classified as buyer initiated and -1
if the transaction is seller initiated (we use the methodology proposed in Lee and Ready
(1991) to classify trades as buys or sells.)
Glosten and Harris indicate that the adverse selection component of a particular
trade is calculated as 2(Z0 + Z1*Trdsizet). We express adverse selection as a proportion
of the spread. Thus for each firm we calculate the average trade size and calculate the
ratio:
2(Z0 + Z1*AvgTrdsizet)
2(Z0 + Z1*AvgTrdsizet) + 2(C0 + C1*AvgTrdsizet),

11

where the numerator is the adverse selection component associated with the average trade
and the denominator is the bid-ask spread for the average trade. We define the variable
Adv_select to be equal to this ratio.
Our second proxy for adverse selection is the firm’s quoted market depth
expressed in dollars.

To calculate the firm’s dollar-depth, we again start by collecting

quote data from TAQ for the 15-month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001.
We eliminate any trades that did not occur on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
exchanges, and any trades not made under normal market conditions. We also eliminate
all aggregate quotes, and all quotes that occur outside normal trading hours. For each
resulting transaction we calculate the dollar depth by adding the number of shares offered
at the bid multiplied by the bid price, and the number of shares offered at the ask
multiplied by the asking price. We divide the resulting sum by 2. The resulting variable
is a measure of quoted dollar depth for the transaction. We then calculate the median
dollar depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15 month period beginning the first
day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. The final
variable $Depth is the average of these daily dollar depths.
Our final proxy for adverse selection is a measure of the firm’s monthly share
turnover for the 15-month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3
months after the end of the fiscal year to measure the liquidity of the firm’s stock.

We

collect the number of shares outstanding and the number of shares traded for each month
of our sample period from the CRSP database. We then divide the number of shares
traded by the number of shares outstanding; the resulting quotient is our measure of
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monthly turnover. Finally, we take the average of the monthly turnover to create the
variable, Monthly_Turnover.
The literatures of both finance and accounting suggest that market measures of
adverse selection are likely to be influenced by factors other than disclosure choices. We
construct several control variables to proxy for these other factors. First, consistent with
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Chiang and Venkatesh (1993), we control for the size of
the firm using the variable LnMVE. LnMVE is calculated by taking the natural log of
the firm’s market value as of December 31, 2001. Following Christie and Huang (1992)
and Huang and Stoll (1996), we also control for the exchange the firm is traded on by
using two indicator variables (NYSE and AMEX). These variables equal one if a firm is
traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, respectively,
and equal zero otherwise. Third, following Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Coller and
Yohn (1997), we control for the firm’s share price using the variable LnPrice. LnPrice
is calculated by first taking the firm’s average share price for the 15-month period
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001, and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal
year. We then take the natural log of the average share price.
Our analysis of the factors that affect the decision to redact predicts that the
redaction decision depends on the firm’s propensity to issue capital, the competitiveness
of the firm’s industry, and the profitability of the firm. We use two different data sources
to determine whether firms issue debt or equity. For equity issuances, we use the SDC
database of seasoned equity offerings. For debt issuances, we use data item 111 on the
Compustat database (long term debt issuances per the financing section of the statement
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of cash-flows).12 We create two indicator variables Equity_issue and Debt-Issue that are
set equal to one if SDC or Compustat indicates the firm issued equity or debt,
respectively, and are otherwise zero.
We use the ranks of the Herfindahl index (Hindex) to measure the
competitiveness of the firm’s industry, calculated at the two-digit SIC level. We use the
firm’s return on assets (ROA), and an indicator variable that is one if the firm has
suffered a loss (LOSS) as proxies for the firm’s profitability. We also include controls
for size (LNMVE) and the number of exhibits filed in 2001 (Num_Exhibits). We expect
a mechanical relation between redaction and the number of exhibits filed, as firms that
file more exhibits are more likely to have an exhibit that contains proprietary information.
4. Sample Selection
Table 1 describes our sample selection process. We start with the 671 firms on the
CRSP database that have a market value of equity between $50 and $100 million as of
December 31, 2001. We focus on this segment of the market, as there are likely to be
relatively few analysts following these firms and limited press coverage. Thus, there is
likely to be a relatively larger impact (in terms of adverse selection) when relatively
small, publicly traded companies withhold information by requesting confidential
treatment.
We then eliminate 56 firms from the sample because they are in the banking
industry, and 40 firms that have missing 10K data or exhibit data that is missing from the
10K filing. Banks are eliminated form the sample because they are subject to additional
12

We did use the SDC database to identify long term debt issuances, and Compustat to identify equity
issuances, but both measures were fraught with omissions and coding problems. Compustat lumps equity
issuances and stock option exercises together, reducing the usefulness of this data item. SDC often omits
long term debt issuances for the small firms that populate our sample. These data problems suggest that
our variables may be measured with noise, which should bias against finding results.
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regulatory disclosure requirements that are not captured in their SEC filings. Firms that
do not have 10K’s on Lexis are eliminated as we are unable to determine whether a
contract has been redacted for these firms.
For the 575 firms that are left in our sample, then we examine the material
contract section to determine whether they have redacted contract information. We found
125 firms that had not made any material filings during the fiscal year 2001. To increase
the power of our tests, we eliminate these firms from the sample. That is, firms that do
not file any contracts in 2001 cannot make a redaction choice. It is not clear how the
market perceives these firms relative to the firms that do disclose material contract, and
relative to those that redact. Thus we exclude these firms from our sample. The resulting
sample of 450 firms is then merged with TAQ database to obtain data on the bid-ask
spread and depth. Of these 450 firms, 427 firms are covered on the TAQ database. Thus,
we delete an additional 23 firms from our sample for the analyses that require TAQ data.
Table 2 provides an overview of the industry classification of the 450 firms in our
final sample (by two digit SIC Code). Other than SIC code 73, which has roughly 20%
of our sample, there does not appear to be a significant clustering in any other industry.
To ensure that industry clustering does not drive our results, we include industry controls
in our examination of the effect of redaction on adverse selection. Each industry with
more than 20 firms has its own indicator variable in that analysis.13
4.1 Description of the Types of Exhibits Disclosed or Redacted.

13

We replicated all tests in the paper excluding these variables, and our test variables remain statistically
significant at conventional levels. It is also important to note that we do not include industry controls in the
determinants model, as the Herfindal index is determined at the industry level, and this would be collinear
with the industry dummies.
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Because we are unaware of any other paper that examines the types of
information disclosed as a material contract in the 10K and the types of information
redacted from the 10K, Table 3 provides summary level data for our sample. In Panel A
we focus on the contracts that were disclosed in the 10K; in panel B we focus on the
contracts that were redacted.
We create 9 different categories to describe the types of data disclosed as material
exhibits. The first category relates to the debt contracts filed by the firm. In this category
we include all debt contracts, loans, waivers, loan amendments, letter agreements, and
guarantees.
The second category includes all employment related contracts. This category
includes option plans, deferred compensation plans, bonus plans, retirement plans,
pension plans, and incentive plans. In addition we also found numerous instances of
employment offer letters, union contracts, consulting agreements, severance agreements,
change in control agreements, and other employment related contracts.
The third category includes contracts that relate to the sale and/or purchase of
assets (other than inventory). In addition to the SEC’s guidance on materiality, discussed
above, the SEC also indicates that any sale or purchase of assets that is greater than 15%
of the firm’s fixed assets must be disclosed.14 The fourth category includes all contracts
that relate to the purchase and sale of inventory or services. The fifth category includes
all license agreements, and the sixth category includes equity related agreements such as
rights agreements, stock purchase or sale agreements, and warrants.

The seventh

category includes all leases. In each of these categories the SEC provides no guidance on
the definition of materiality (other then the general guidance discussed above).
14

See subpart 229.600 — Exhibits of the SEC’s Regulation S-K for this rule.
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The eighth category includes all contracts related to mergers and acquisition
agreements. Generally, the SEC requires the actual merger agreements to be filed as an
Exhibit 2.XXX. There are often ancillary agreements, however, that get filed as material
contracts. The final category, other, captures the assortment of miscellaneous contracts
filed with the SEC.
Panel A of Table 3 indicates that firms most often file employment related
contracts with the SEC followed by debt agreements, miscellaneous agreements, and
equity related contracts. Focusing on the total sample, the firms in our sample filed an
average of 7 contracts in fiscal 2001.
Panel B of Table 3 indicates that firms seldom redact data from debt related
contracts, employment agreements, lease agreements, merger agreements and asset
purchase agreements. This is not particularly surprising, as it is difficult to justify that
these types of contracts contain proprietary information. Firms most often redact data
from the miscellaneous contracts that they file, from their license agreements, and from
purchase and sale agreements. These types of contracts are much more likely to contain
cost and pricing data that is likely to be proprietary. At the bottom of Panel B we
tabulate the number of firms in our sample that redacted data during fiscal year 2001, and
find that 74 of the 450 firms in our sample, 16%, elected to redact data. We also
examined the exhibit list to determine, historically, how often the firms in our sample
redact data.

We found that at least 122 of the 450 firms in our sample, 27%, had a

request for confidential treatment granted at some point in their history.15

15

It is possible that several other firms requested confidential treatment for a contract at some point in their
history, and this has not been disclosed in the 10K because the contract is no longer relevant. In this case,
in the periods when the contract was relevant, the confidential status would have been disclosed in the
exhibit list.
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5. Research Design
Our first analysis focuses on the relation between disclosure and adverse
selection. That is, we run the following regressions:
Adv_Select = α Intercept β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE + β4NYSE +
β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε
(1)
$Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5
AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε
(2)
MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE +
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε,
(3)
where the variables are defined as follows.
Adv_Select - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection. We use the in trade and
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files. We first calculate the dollar depth for an
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price. We
divide the resulting sum by 2. The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the
end of the fiscal year. The final variable is the average of these daily $depths.
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. The
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined.
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise.
Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero
otherwise.
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock
exchange, zero otherwise.
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LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal
year.
To provide evidence on the determinants of the decision to redact information
from the contract, we run the following probit regression:
Redactdum = α Intercept + β1 Equity_Issue + β2 Debt_Issue + β3Hindex + β4ROA+ β5
Loss + β6 LnMVE + β7 Ln(NumofExib) + ε,
(4)
where the variables are defines as follows.
Redactdum - Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm redacted information form a
disclosure during fiscal year 2001, 0 otherwise.
Debt_Issue - Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise.
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as
per the SDC database), 0 otherwise.
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index calculated
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular
the 2 digit SIC code. Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6).
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
Our final analysis examines the association between disclosure and measures of
adverse selection with controls for self-selection. That is, we use the Heckmen (1976)
self-selection correction methodology to control for the determinants of the firm’s
decision to disclose or redact financial information. To implement this methodology we
first estimate the model of the determinants to redact information (model 4 above). We
then calculate the inverse mills ratios from this model and include it in our second stage

19

model of the determinants of our proxies for the extent of the firm’s adverse selection
problem.
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for our test and control variables. We find
that 16% of the firms in our sample issued equity while 44% of the firms issued some
form of long term debt (either public or private). We also find that over 60% of the firms
in our sample suffered losses in fiscal 2001. The average adverse selection component of
the bid-ask spread for our sample firms is 19%. The average quoted dollar-depth for our
sample is $4400. The average monthly turnover of the firm’s outstanding shares is
approximately 8%. Not surprisingly, these firms have lower depths and share turnover
than the average firm on NYSE and NASDAQ. This is primarily attributable to sampling
only small firms from these exchanges.
The firms in our sample disclose an average of slightly more than 7 exhibits per
year and redact data from 0.44 exhibits per year. Because our sample is comprised of
small firms, these averages may be significantly different than those of larger firms.
6.2 Multivariate results
In Table 5, we report our results on the association between our measures of
adverse selection and the extent of redacted information. Focusing on the first column of
results, the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread is positively
associated with our proxy for the extent of redaction. Market makers penalize trade in
firms that redact information from their material contracts by increasing the cost of
executing orders. The economic significance of this coefficient suggests that the adverse
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selection component of the bid-ask spread is 2% larger for firms that redact information
from their material contracts. We also find all of our control variables are significant
(other than the number of exhibits filed). Larger firms enjoy less adverse selection.
Compared to firms on NASDAQ, firms on NYSE experience less adverse selection while
firms on AMEX experience more. We also find that firms with higher prices experience
more adverse selection.
The second column of results reports the determinants of quoted depth. Firms
that withhold information by redacting data have relatively smaller dollar depths. This
suggests that when firms elect to redact information, the market maker responds by
reducing the number of shares they are willing to buy or sell at their quoted prices. This
implies that redaction of data increases costs that result from adverse selection. The
coefficient of 5.99 indicates that the market maker reduces quoted depths by $599 when
firms redact information from their material contracts. We find that larger firms have
marginally smaller quoted dollar depths. The relatively small impact of firm size on
depth is likely in part driven by the sample selection procedures that limit the size of the
firms in this sample. We also find that firms that have higher prices have greater depths.
The third column reports the results on turnover. Firms that redact financial
information appear to have lower shareholder turnover than firms that do not. The
redaction of information appears to reduce the average monthly turnover by 1%. The
control variables for the NYSE and Size are both statistically significant and positive,
indicating that the larger firms and firms on NYSE enjoy a more liquid market. The
other control variables are not significant. Overall the results from these three sets of
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tests, reported on Table 5, support our hypotheses. When firms redact information from
their material contract disclosures, adverse selection increases.
In Table 6 we report the results of our probit analysis, examining the determinants
of the decision to redact information.

We find that firms are less likely to redact

information when they issue long-term debt. This is consistent with the extant literature
which finds that firms tend to disclose more information in anticipation of raising capital.
We also find that firms in less (more) competitive industries are less (more) likely
to redact information from their material contracts. This result suggests that small firms
may choose to redact information to reduce the potential product market effects of
disclosing proprietary information. This is consistent with the theoretical literature that
argues that competition reduces a firm’s propensity to make proprietary disclosures (e.g.,
Verrecchia, 1990). In light of relatively little empirical evidence regarding the effect of
competition on disclosure choices (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001), it is also a potentially
important result in the empirical literature.
We also find that loss firms are more likely to redact information. Skinner (1997)
argues that loss firms are more likely to disclose bad earnings-related news to reduce
litigation costs. Our results suggest that firms that suffer losses are more likely to
withhold proprietary information from the market. Because the SEC must approve these
requests, they are unlikely to trigger litigation. Not surprisingly, we also find that firms
that file more exhibits are more likely to redact information.
We recognize that the redaction of material contract information is a choice, and
thus there may be systematic differences in the types of firms that redact information.
This suggests that there may be a self-selection problem. To address this problem we
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employ the self-selection correction model advocated in Heckman (1976). We use our
model of the determinants of the decision to redact information to derive an inverse mills
ratio, and include this ratio as an explanatory variable in our models of the determinants
of adverse selection. The results of this procedure are reported in Table 7.
The first and second columns of Table 7 suggest that controlling for self-selection
does not appear to affect the relation between redaction and the adverse selection
component of the firm’s bid-ask spread or dollar depth. The third column suggests that
self-selection does, in part, affect the relations between redaction and share turnover.
Overall, after controlling for self-selection, it appears that firms that redact information
are penalized through reduced depth and larger adverse selection component.
6.3 Sensitivity Analyses
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to a number of our research design
choices. First, theory suggests that disclosure choices like redaction are likely to be
related to public debt issuances, as opposed to private debt issuances (e.g., Sengupta,
1998). As we discuss above, our proxy for debt issuances includes both public and
private debt issuances. To provide evidence on whether redaction is associated with
public debt issuances, we hand-collected data from the firm’s registration statements and
used the SDC data on public debt issuances to determine whether the firms in our sample
issued public debt. We find relatively few instances of public debt being issued. When
we replace the debt issuance variable used in the main analysis with a variable that is
based on the SDC data, the results on the debt issuance variable become insignificant.
These results imply that information redaction is less likely to occur when firms enter
into private debt contracts. While this result may seem unusual, note that firms may be
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entering into private debt contracts through syndicated loans, which are traded. As such,
investors who purchase syndicated debt will not have access to proprietary information.
This may motivate firms to redact less.
In addition, we replaced our measure of redaction with a continuous measure and
find results qualitatively similar to those we report in Table 6. We replaced our measure
of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread with the actual bid-ask spread
and find that firms that redact information have larger spreads. Finally, we replaced our
dollar depth measure with the depth in shares and find qualitatively similar results.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we attempt to relate the disclosure choices firms make with regard to
redacting proprietary information from the material contracts filed with their financial
statements, with various measures of the severity of the adverse selection problem in
trade that involves firm securities. Our predictions are based on the notion that redaction
of proprietary information from a firm’s material contracts should manifest itself as an
increase in the adverse selection component of the firm’s bid-ask spread, a reduction in
market depth, and a reduction in market turnover.
We find that firms that redact information from their material contracts filings
during the fiscal year have a higher adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread,
lower quoted dollar depths, and lower monthly turnover. Cumulatively, we interpret the
empirical evidence as confirming our prediction that there is a relation between firms’
disclosure choices and measures of adverse selection. We also find that small, publicly
traded companies are less likely to redact information from their material contract filings
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when they issue debt, and more likely to redact information when they are in a
competitive industry or suffering losses.
These results imply that small firms in competitive industries elect to redact
proprietary information from their material contracts. The benefit of redaction is that
these firms avoid the dissemination of proprietary information, which is harmful in their
product markets. The cost of redaction is that it results in increased adverse selection,
which should be associated with that part of the firm’s cost of capital that arises from
information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders, and/or among investors.
Presumably, these firms elect not to disclose because they are willing to trade off the
former against the latter.
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Table 1
Sample Selection

Firms on CRSP traded on NYSE
AMEX or NASDAQ and with
MVE between $50 - $100 million
as of Dec 31, 2001

671

Less:
Firms in the banking industry
Firms missing 10 K data on
Lexis/Nexis or firms with missing
exhibit lists

56
40

Non-financial firms on CRSP with
MVE between 50-100 million that
traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, or
AMEX and have 10k data

575

Less :
Firms that did not file any exhibits
in fiscal 2001

125

Firms with sufficient data to
compute turnover proxies

450

Less
Firms with missing TAQ data16

23

Firms with data to compute adverse
selection and moral hazard proxies

427

16

These 23 firms are included in the turnover analyses, as they have sufficient data to calculate our
turnover metric.
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Table 2
Industry Composition of the Sample
Two Digit SIC
Code
13
20
28
33
35
36
37
38
48
49
50
51
58
59
61
62
67
73
80
87
---

Industry Name

Number of firms

Oil and Gas Extraction
Food and Kindred Products
Chemicals and Allied Products
Primary Metal industries
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
Electronic and Other Electronic Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and Related Products
Communications
Electric, gas, and sanitary services
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods
Wholesale Trade- Non Durable Goods
Eating and Drinking places
Miscellaneous retail
Non-Depository Credit Institutions
Security and Commodity brokers
Holding and other investment offices
Business Services
Health Services
Engineering and management services
Firms in industries with fewer than 5 firms

17
6
37
10
23
31
7
38
14
10
8
12
7
8
6
5
6
84
9
15
97

Total

450
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Table 3
Descriptive Information on the types of Exhibits filed by the firms in our sample
Panel A: Exhibits filed without any redacted information (for the 684 firms that have 10k
information available on Lexis/nexis)

Debt related
Employment (option
plans, offer letters,
severance etc..)
Asset Purchase
Purchase/sale of
inventory or services
License
Merger related
Leases
Equity related
disclosures
Other
Total

Average number
of exhibits filed
by firm

Maximum number of
exhibits filed by a
firm in our sample

1.42

22

1035

2.30

20

37

0.08

3

109
83
20
191

0.25
0.18
0.04
0.42

12
5
4
9

386
799

0.86
1.77

33
47

3301

7.33

Total number of
exhibits filed in
fiscal year 2001 for
the firms in our
sample
641
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Table 3
Descriptive Information on the types of Exhibits filed by the firms in our sample
Panel B: Exhibits filed in which there was information redacted (for the 684 firms that
have 10k information available on Lexis/nexis)
Total number of
exhibits filed in
fiscal year 2001 with
redacted info for the
firms in our sample
7

Average number
of exhibits filed
with redacted
info by firm

Maximum number of
exhibits with
redacted info filed by
a firm in our sample

0.02

5

7

0.02

2

3

0.01

1

30
39
0
0

0.07
0.09
0
0

9
4
0
0

8
105

0.02
0.23

3
16

Total

199

0.44

Number of firms
filing at least one
request to redact data
from an exhibit in
2001

74

Number of firms that
had filed a request to
redact data at some
point as per their
2001 10K

122

Debt related
Employment (option
plans, offer letters,
severance etc..)
Asset Purchase
Purchase/sale of
inventory or services
License
Merger related
Leases
Equity related
disclosures
Other
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics – All Firms in Final Sample
Mean
Variable
Q1
(Median)
Q3
Std Dev
0.16
Redactdum
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
0.37
0.44
(0.00)
Debt_Issue
0.00
1.00
0.49
0.18
Equity_Issue
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
0.38
226.5
Hindex
11.5
(191.5)
334.5
130.0
-0.24
ROA
-0.35
(-0.04)
0.03
0.68
0.62
Loss
0.00
(1.00)
1.00
0.48
11.18
LN MVE
10.91
(11.18)
11.41
0.52
1.57
LN(Num of Exib)
1.10
(1.60)
2.30
0.93
0.19
(0.14)
Adv_Select
0.11
0.20
0.16
44.0
$Depth
21.5
(34.6)
56
31.1
0.08
Monthly_Turnover
0.03
(0.06)
0.10
0.08
0.78
NYSE
1.00
(1.00)
1.00
0.41
0.08
AMEX
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
0.27
1.62
LN Price
1.15
(1.61)
2.11
0.74
Number of Firms – 450 (except for $depth and adv-selection variables in which case it
is 427)
Variable Definitions
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise.
Debt_Issue - Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise.
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as
per the SDC database0, 0 otherwise.
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index calculated
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular
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the 2 digit SIC code. Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6).
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise.
Adv_Select - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection. We use the in trade and
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files. We first calculate the dollar depth for an
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price. We
divide the resulting sum by 2. The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the
end of the fiscal year. The final variable is the average of these daily $depths.
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. The
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined.
Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero
otherwise.
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock
exchange, zero otherwise.
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal
year.
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Table 5
Regression Results – Spread, Volatility, and Turnover Regressions
Model 1: Adv_Select = α Intercept β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE +
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε
Model 2: $Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE +
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε
Model 3: MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +
β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + ε
Model 1
Model 2
Pred. Coefficient Pred Coefficient
Variable
Sign (T-Statistic) Sign (T-Statistic)
1.00
88.42
Intercept
?
(14.51)***
?
(3.86)***
0.02
-5.99
RedactDum
+
(1.70)**
(-2.01)**
-0.001
1.05
LnNumofExib
?
(-0.32)
?
(0.93)
-0.06
-3.65
LNMVE
(-9.57)***
+
(-1.79)*
-0.30
-43.89
NYSE
?
(-30.66)***
?
(-13.46)***
0.10
-9.23
AMEX
?
(7.25)***
?
(-1.77)*
0.05
21.20
LNPrice
?
(11.65)***
?
(13.82)***
Coefficients and T-Stats on Industry indicators are suppressed
Adjusted RSquared
83.7%
56.4%
Number Obs
427
427

Pred
Sign
?
?
+
?
?
?

Model 3
Coefficient
(T-Statistic)
-0.57
(-7.87)***
-0.01
(-1.94)**
0.01
(2.83)***
0.05
(8.20)***
0.04
(4.56)***
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
21.6%
450

*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Variable Definitions
Adv_Select - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection. We use the in trade and
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.
$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files. We first calculate the dollar depth for an
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price. We
divide the resulting sum by 2. The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.
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Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the
end of the fiscal year. The final variable is the average of these daily $depths.
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. The
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined.
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise.
Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero
otherwise.
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock
exchange, zero otherwise.
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal
year.
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Table 6
Probit regression examining the determinants of the decision to redact information from
the material contracts filed with a firm’s financial reports
Model 4: Redactdum = α Intercept + β1 Equity_Issue + β2 Debt_Issue + β3Hindex +
β4ROA+ β5 Loss + β6 LnMVE + β5 Ln(NumofExib) + ε

Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept

?

Equity_Issue

-

Debt_Issue

-

Hindex

?

ROA

?

Loss

?

LnMVE

?

Ln(Num of Exib)
Pseudo R-Squared
Variable Definitions:

?

Coefficient
(Chi_sqr)
-1.77
(-1.10)**
0.12
(0.39)
-0.41
(6.25)***
-0.002
(-13.36)**
0.05
(0.20)
0.50
(6.21)***
0.36
(0.06)
0.39
(19.47)***
16.2%

Redactdum - Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm redacted information form a
disclosure during fiscal year 2001, 0 otherwise.
Debt_Issue - Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued debt during fiscal 2001
(COMPUSTAT data item 111) , 0 otherwise.
Equity_Issue – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm issued equity during fiscal 2001 (as
per the SDC database0, 0 otherwise.
Hindex – The rank of the industries Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index calculated
as the sum of the squared market share of each publicly traded company in a particular
the 2 digit SIC code. Market share is calculated as the sales of a particular company
divided by the total sales of the SIC code.
ROA – Net income/Assets (CMPUSTAT data items 172 and 6).
Loss – Indicator variable that is 1 if the firm had a loss, 0 otherwise.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
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Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
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Table 7
Regression Results – Spread, Volatility, and Turnover Regressions
with controls for self-selection
Model 1: Adv_Select = α Intercept β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE +
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL + ε
Model 2: $Depth = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib + β3LnMVE +
β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL + ε
Model 3: MonthlyTurnover = α Intercept + β1 RedactDum + β2LnNumofExib +
β3LnMVE + β4NYSE + β5 AMEX + β6 LNPrice + β7 IMILL + ε
Model 1
Model 2
Pred. Coefficient
Pred
Coefficient
Pred
Variable
Sign (T-Statistic)
Sign
(T-Statistic)
Sign
1.04
81.53
Intercept
?
(14.77)***
?
(3.47)***
?
0.08
-27.92
Redactdum
(2.34)***
+
(-2.51)***
+
Ln(Num of
-0.006
3.05
Exhib)
+
(-1.52)
(2.08)**
-0.06
-3.03
LNMVE
(-10.01)***
(-1.45)
+
-0.31
-42.89
NYSE
?
(-30.47)***
?
(-12.95)***
?
0.09
-7.87
AMEX
?
(6.92)***
?
(-1.67)*
?
0.05
20.58
LNPrice
(11.82)***
(13.15)***
-0.03
13.15
IMILL
?
(-1.86)*
?
(2.08)**
?
Coefficients and T-Stats on industry indicator variables are surpressed
Adjusted
R-Squared
83.4%
55.1%
Number Obs

Model 3
Coefficient
(T-Statistic)
-0.54
(-7.13)***
0.04
(1.04)
0.005
(1.12)
0.05
(7.43)***
0.04
(3.85)***
-0.005
(-0.35)
0.004
(0.87)
-0.03
(-1.61)
20.8%

*,**,*** Statistically significant at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Variable Definitions
Adv_Select - We use the methodology proposed in Glosten and Harris (1988) and the
trade identification procedure proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) to calculate the
percentage of the spread that is related to adverse selection. We use the in trade and
quote data for our sample firms for the 15 month period beginning the first day of fiscal
year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year.
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$Depth – Calculated using the TAQ quote files. We first calculate the dollar depth for an
individual trade by adding the number of shares offered at the bid multiplied by the bid
price and the number of shares offered at the ask multiplied by the asking price. We
divide the resulting sum by 2. The resulting variable is a measure of quoted $Depth.
Finally, we then calculate the median $depth for each firm/day in our sample for the 15
month period beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the
end of the fiscal year. The final variable is the average of these daily $depths.
Monthly Turnover – Calculated by dividing the monthly volume of shares traded by the
number of shares outstanding for each firm month for the 15 month period beginning the
first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year. The
average monthly turnover for the firm is then determined.
Redactdum – An indicator variable set equal to one if the firm filed a requests for
confidential treatment for the fiscal year 2001, zero otherwise.
Ln(Num of Exib) – Calculated as the natural log of the number of exhibits filed in fiscal
2001.
LNMVE – The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity (in $100,000), calculated
on December 31, 2001.
NYSE – Indicator that is one if the firm is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, zero
otherwise.
AMEX- Indicator variable that is one if the firm is traded on the American stock
exchange, zero otherwise.
LnPrice – The natural log of the median price per share for the 15 month period
beginning the first day of fiscal year 2001 and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal
year.
IMILL - The inverse mills ratio calculated from model 1 Table 7 panel A.
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